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Beyond the Headlines: Examining the Complexities of the Taliban
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Beyond the Headlines: Examining the Complexities of the Taliban

✍️ Nikhil Girish & Tanishka Pasarad

Published: 2023-04-21


Beyond the Headlines: Examining the Complexities of the Taliban

By Nikhil Girish and Tanishka Pasarad

Authors’ Note: Our use of Taliban in the article refers to the Afghan Taliban. Reference to any other regional Taliban will be specified, e.g: the Pakistani Taliban.

Introduction

Afghanistan. The graveyard of empires. And the birthplace of one of the most infamous organisations in recent history: the Taliban. Motivated by the suffering of the Afghan people, the Islamic fundamentalist, Pashtun nationalist, militant political movement was born in 1994. Founded by Mullah Mohammad Omar after leaving the Sang-i-Hisar Madrassa in Maiwand with just 50 students, they managed to grow to over 15,000 with the addition of students from Pakistani madrassas in just months - in fact, the word Taliban is Pashto for “students” (the singular being talib). With the recruits from Pakistan came financial and military support from the country, slowly developing the group into a proxy force for Pakistani interests in the region.

They committed their first attack on November 3, 1994, taking control of Kandahar City in a surprise attack, losing only a dozen men in the fight. By eradicating corruption, curbing lawlessness and making controlled areas a haven for commerce, they quickly gained popularity. Over the next 2 months, the Taliban took control of 12 provinces and by February 1995, it had grown to 25,000 fighters - a formidable force with experience, considering many of their numbers were former Mujahedeen.

On 26 September 1996, Kabul was flooded by the Taliban and came under their control, establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with the goal of establishing an Islamic government with a strict interpretation of Sharia law, in accordance with the Hanafi school of Fiqh (Islamic law) and the religious edicts of their founder, Mullah Omar. By 1998 the Emirate controlled nearly 90% of Afghanistan but 2001 brought ill fortune for the Taliban with the invasion of the US, its allies, and the Afghan Northern Alliance - forcing the leadership to flee to Pakistan. [^1]

Taliban Taliban

Amidst the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan from 2020 to 2021, the Taliban launched a major offensive, securing half of Afghanistan’s ~400 districts by late July 2021[^2] rocketing them to the forefront of global news; cementing the return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Despite assurances to the international community that the current Taliban are different from their predecessors, they appear to be slipping into their old ways, but only time will tell whether they have truly grown from their brutal past.


History

Understanding the history of the Taliban requires us to dive into the history, and the geography to an extent, of Afghanistan itself. Taking a look at its position on the map, we begin to understand the strategic importance of the land that served as the centre of the ancient Silk Roads; acting as a gateway to the Indian subcontinent, and connecting China to western Asia and Europe, Afghanistan is where trade routes across Eurasia converged. With such a crucial position, it is crystal clear why so many wished to conquer this land. This unique gateway position is what piqued British interests in the 19th century, as they sought to protect the Crown Jewel of their empire - India - from potential Russian expansion. Seeing annexation as the only possible option, thus began the Anglo-Afghan wars which failed to achieve the British goal (thanks to an army exhausted by WWI), instead creating the independent nation of Afghanistan.

Despite the history of conflict in the region, it is during the Cold War period that the events which have greatly influenced modern Afghanistan and shaped the Taliban transpired. In 1953, the roots for Soviet-Afghan cooperation were laid by then-Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan who was forced to resign in 1963 following an economic crisis stemming from disputes with Pakistan. Post his resignation, the king (his cousin) Zahir Shah played a more active role, putting into effect a liberal constitution in 1964. Although the reforms from his experimentation were not all long-lasting they allowed the growth of both left and right parties like the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

From here on, the history becomes more turbulent; in 1973, Daoud Khan seized power in a non-violent coup, abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution and declared himself the first President and Prime Minister of the new republic of Afghanistan. His success was short-lived as his attempts at social and economic reforms failed, and his brutal government was overthrown on 28 April 1978, by the Khalq faction of the PDPA, following which he and his family were assassinated in a bloody military coup that came to be known as the Saur revolution. At this point it is important to note the practice of ‘bi-tarafi’ that had become a tenet of foreign policy in the early ‘70s: army officers who had been to the US and the USSR for training programs arrived overwhelmingly at one conclusion - Afghanistan should remain independent. With the changes in the Middle East in the late ‘60s and the rise of anti-western sentiment, the USSR had followed a consistent course of expanding its political and military influence, a strategy that mirrored that of Washington post WWII - a strategy that Afghanistan was now a part of. Once in power, the PDPA, went about implementing Marxist-Leninist [^3] principles in governance, replacing traditional and religious laws. They also invited the Soviet Union for their assistance in modernising Afghanistan’s economic infrastructure, to which the USSR responded positively, dispatching contractors to build crucial infrastructure like roads, schools, hospitals, and to train and equip the Afghan Armed Forces. In total, the USSR promised monetary aid to the tune of $1.2bn. But the brutal and ruthless nature of the PDPA government and their hardline stance against religion made them extremely unpopular amongst the populace, uniting traditionalists, landlords, tribal leaders and mullahs who revolted in 1979. The USSR sided with the ruling government, dispatching grain and food and waiving interest payments for outstanding loans, as well as providing military equipment. The level of Soviet involvement worried the US, who were considering future repercussions of Soviet actions in the situation. The murder of the US ambassador to Kabul in 1979 forced the US to engage more directly with the conflict in Afghanistan, cutting off any aid it had been sending, and providing support to anti-Communists and others who opposed the new government - a move that completely lacked foresight, as these were the same groups who opposed all Western meddling in Afghanistan. While the price of this deal, and supporting Islamists was not readily apparent, it would hit the world like a truck with the emergence of terror groups, decades down the line.

With increased military preparedness from the Soviet side in the later half of 1979, apparently ready for an intervention, tensions were high in Washington. But tensions in Moscow were even higher when Hafizullah Amin seized power, as the Soviets felt threatened by the prospect that Amin being friendly with the US would mean that America could point a dagger right at the heart of the Soviet Union (since the southern frontier of the USSR lacked a comprehensive air-defence system). The only solution in their eyes? A full blown invasion of Afghanistan, or in their words, “an attempt to restore stability”. Washington had been dealt a terrible hand. On one hand they were managing the crisis in Iran (that they were mostly responsible for), and now they had to face their worst fear. America’s solution? Support those opposing the invasion, the ‘Mujahedeen’, by providing them with weapons supplied by the CIA through Pakistan. It was the birth of terrorism as we know it today in the view of many. In addition to the money and weapons that flowed from the US, money came in from Saudi Arabia in support of the Mujahedeen - a result of Saudi sympathy for the Islamic militant rhetoric the resistance employed. Another unlikely ally of the anti-Soviet resistance was Beijing. Afghanistan had become the USSR’s Vietnam. The effects of supplying so much weaponry, training and money throughout the ‘80s to the resistance would become apparent soon, as former Mujahedeen soldiers became part of the Taliban. After seizing Kabul in 1996 and after attacks masterminded by Osama bin Laden in 1992 and 1993, and the al-Qaida bombings of US embassies in 1998, the US had come to realise their folly in so readily supplying weapons to militants whose only goal was to oppose foreign intervention in their conflict-riddled country. After President Bush’s retaliation, relations with the Taliban soured and the Taliban sided al-Qaida and bin Laden. The common sentiment in the Arab world at the time was that US policies propped up corrupt regimes designed to divide and weaken the Arab world. Post 9/11, the US took a harsher stance on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which resulted in the protracted and somewhat successful War on Terror. Now we have successfully understood the historical conditions that resulted in the formation of the Taliban, and managed to gain an understanding of general sentiment at the time among Afghans.

An analysis of the Taliban with this historical context establishes them as a group who want to reject undue Western influence in their country, albeit through extreme means. Given the brutality of the US and the USSR, the Taliban’s use of force is contextually vindicated. A fire must be fought with fire after all. So then why are they classified as a terror group?

Taliban with Reagan Taliban with Reagan


The Taliban and Terror

While many members had previous experience as Mujahedeen, the creation of the Taliban itself was quite influenced by the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency, to further Pakistan’s strategic goals [^4]. The Taliban is responsible for numerous terror attacks, both inside and outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to UN officials, in the Taliban’s attempt to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, there had been “15 massacres” between 1996 and 2001. In 1998, the United Nations accused the Taliban of denying emergency food by the UN’s World Food Programme to 160,000 hungry and starving people “for political and military reasons”[^5]. Once again, in 1998, they ethnically cleansed Mazar-i-Sharif, resulting in 5000 - 6000 dead. The tale of the Taliban’s attempts to secure control over Afghanistan are blotted with numerous brutal and deadly attacks against civilians, forcing hundreds of thousands from their homes, and wanton destruction - so many stories that they cannot be detailed in this article.

Taliban marching Taliban marching

In 2011 alone, they killed former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, the police chief in northern Afghanistan, the commander of the elite anti-Taliban 303 Pamir Corps, Mohammad Daud Daud, and the police chief of Kunduz, Abdul Rahman Saidkhaili, all notable anti-Taliban leaders. In fact, the US Department of Defense believes that the Taliban may have a 40-man undercover unit dedicated to targeted killings[^6]. In January 2018, a Taliban suicide bomber killed over 100 people in Kabul using a bomb in an ambulance. Additionally, according to the United Nations, the Taliban and its allies were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009, 75% in 2010 and 80% in 2011. A group that had been born from those concerned about the suffering of the Afghan people has become the reason for their suffering.


Taliban’s recent return to power

The Taliban’s recent return to power in Afghanistan is the culmination of a complex and rapidly evolving set of circumstances, including the withdrawal of US and NATO troops, the collapse of the Afghan government, and the Taliban’s military and political strategies. The withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan was a key factor in the Taliban’s return to power. In April 2021, US President Joe Biden announced that all US troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, effectively ending the US military presence in the country after two decades of war. This decision was based on a desire to end what many Americans saw as a costly and futile war, and to shift US foreign policy priorities towards other global challenges such as China and Russia.

Modern Taliban

Modern Taliban

However, the withdrawal of US and NATO troops left the Afghan government and military without critical logistical and military support, which weakened their ability to resist the Taliban’s military advances. The Taliban launched a series of lightning offensives across the country, rapidly capturing key cities and towns and undermining the legitimacy and authority of the Afghan government. The collapse of the Afghan government was also a significant factor in the Taliban’s return to power. Despite years of US and international support, the Afghan government was plagued by corruption, mismanagement, and internal divisions, which weakened its ability to govern effectively and respond to the Taliban’s military advances. As the Taliban gained ground, many Afghan security forces and government officials either surrendered or fled the country including the President Ashraf Ghani who fled the country saying he wanted to avoid bloodshed all while leaving the government and military in disarray.

The Taliban’s military and political strategies were also crucial to their return to power. The group had spent years preparing for the eventual withdrawal of US and NATO troops, building up their military capabilities, strengthening their political networks, and honing their messaging and propaganda. As the Taliban advanced, they also sought to present themselves as a legitimate and credible alternative to the corrupt and ineffective government in Kabul, highlighting their ability to maintain security and provide basic services in areas under their control.

The circumstances surrounding the Taliban’s recent return to power reflect the legacy of two decades of war and political instability in Afghanistan, as well as the shifting priorities and strategies of international actors such as the US and NATO. The challenge for Afghanistan and the international community now is to navigate this complex and evolving landscape, and to work towards a future that is peaceful, stable, and prosperous for all Afghans.

Since returning to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have made a number of statements and taken several actions that have been closely followed by the international community. These include pledges to respect human rights, specifically women’s rights, the formation of a new government, as well as efforts to reach out to the international community. The Taliban have made several public statements since their return to power, pledging to respect human rights, protect women’s rights, and ensure the safety of all Afghan citizens. However, these statements have been met with scepticism by many, given the Taliban’s history of brutal repression and violations of human rights during their previous period in power in the 1990s.

Despite their promises to uphold and protect women’s and minorities’ rights, many Afghan women are fearful of the Taliban’s return to power, given their history of misogyny and discrimination against women. Reports of forced marriages, sexual violence, and other abuses by the Taliban have also raised concerns about their commitment to human rights. A new government led by Mullah Hasan Akhund has also been formed, including many former leaders and members, as well as some new faces. This new government has been criticised for its lack of diversity and representation, with few women or members of ethnic minorities in top positions. Accusations of ignoring the concerns and interests of other political groups and factions in Afghanistan, including the former government and opposition forces have also been levelled against the Taliban.

Since returning to power, the Taliban have sought to engage with the international community, through diplomatic channels and public statements. The group has pledged to cooperate with other countries and to respect international law and norms. However, these efforts have been complicated by the Taliban’s designation as a terrorist group by many countries, including the US and UK. Their links to other extremist groups and their human rights record have also complicated their attempts at forging international connections. All in all, the Taliban’s statements and actions since returning to power have been mixed, with some promising signs of engagement with the international community and their pledges to respect human rights amidst concerns about their commitment to these principles, given their history of repression and abuses.

The challenge now for the Taliban and the international community is to navigate these complex issues and work towards a more stable and peaceful future for Afghanistan.


The Western perspective of the Taliban

Western perceptions of the Taliban have been shaped by a range of factors, including media coverage, political rhetoric, and the group’s own actions. However, these perceptions are not always accurate or as nuanced as they should be, often overlooking the complex social, political, and economic dynamics that contributed to the group’s rise and persistence in Afghanistan.

One common feature of Western perceptions of the Taliban is the tendency to portray the group as a monolithic entity, with a uniform set of beliefs and goals. This perspective overlooks the fact that the Taliban is a diverse and heterogeneous organisation, with different factions and leaders with different priorities and agendas. Another issue with Western perceptions of the Taliban is the tendency to view the group solely through the lens of terrorism and extremism. While the Taliban has certainly engaged in acts of violence and terror, this is only one aspect of the group’s broader strategy, which also includes social and political mobilisation, propaganda, and negotiation. By reducing the Taliban to a simplistic caricature of religious fanaticism and violence, Western policymakers and analysts risk overlooking the more complex and nuanced factors that have contributed to the group’s persistence and appeal. By overlooking these factors, the solutions they come up with to combat the spread of the Taliban remain ineffective - they are trying to treat symptoms without attempting to understand the disease. Moreover, the Western perspective on the Taliban has often been shaped by geopolitical interests and strategic considerations, rather than a genuine understanding of the group’s ideology, goals, and grievances. For example, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was justified in part by the need to eliminate Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies, but this intervention also had broader geopolitical objectives, such as the establishment of a friendly government in Kabul and the control of strategic resources in Central Asia.

While the Western perceptions of the Taliban are not entirely unfounded, they are often simplistic, reductionist, and ideologically driven. To develop a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the group, it is necessary to engage with the diverse social, political, and economic factors that have contributed to its rise and persistence, and to address these in foreign policy to prevent further spread of the group and similar outfits.

Afghan perspective on the Taliban

Afghan perspectives on the Taliban are shaped by a range of factors, like geography, ethnicity, religion, and socio-economic status. These diverse perspectives reflect the complex and often contradictory forces that have shaped Afghanistan’s history, culture, and politics.

One group that supports the Taliban are rural Afghans, particularly in the southern and eastern regions of the country, where the Taliban has traditionally had its strongest base of support. For many of these Afghans, the Taliban is seen as a legitimate and effective alternative to the corrupt and ineffective government in Kabul, which is widely perceived as dominated by a small elite of urban, educated, and wealthy elites. The Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic law is also seen as a way to combat the perceived moral decay and social disintegration that have accompanied decades of war, violence, and instability.

However, there are also many Afghans who fear the return of the Taliban to power, particularly women, religious minorities, and secularists who remember the group’s repressive policies and human rights abuses during its previous rule. For these Afghans, the Taliban represents a threat to their freedom, dignity, and identity, and they are concerned that the group will seek to impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law on the entire country. These Afghans are also concerned that the Taliban’s return to power will lead to renewed violence and instability, and that the gains made in areas such as education, health care, and women’s rights since the Taliban was ousted in 2001 will be lost.

There are also Afghans who are cautiously optimistic about the Taliban’s new government, which was formed in September 2021. These Afghans hope that the Taliban will honour its commitments to protect human rights, maintain a diverse and inclusive government, and work towards a peaceful and prosperous future for all Afghans. Many of these Afghans recognize that the Taliban’s previous rule was characterised by repressive policies and human rights abuses, but they also believe that the group has changed in response to the changing political and social context in Afghanistan. They point to the Taliban’s participation in negotiations with the Afghan government, its public commitments to protect human rights, and its efforts to project a more moderate and conciliatory image as evidence of this change.

Overall, the diverse perspectives of Afghans on the Taliban reflect the complex and multi-faceted nature of the country’s political and social landscape. These perspectives cannot be reduced to simple categories of support or opposition, but reflect the complex interplay of social, economic, cultural, and historical factors that shape Afghan identity and politics. Any effective strategy for promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Afghanistan will need to take into account these diverse perspectives, and to engage with all stakeholders in a dialogue of mutual understanding and compromise.


Conclusion

While this article has been less than as comprehensive as we’d like in tackling as vast an issue as this, we hope that we were able to provide a new perspective on one of the world’s most dangerous groups; a perspective that recognises the hand the West played in its creation, both directly and indirectly, and one that is able to convey the varying perspectives of Afghans with the context necessary to understanding these perspectives. Thank you for reading our article!

[^1]: Stanford CISAC [^2]: Reuters [^3]: While the actuality is more complex than can be explained in a footnote, a brief explanation is that Marxism-Leninism is the result of Lenin introducing his theory of imperialism to Orthodox Marxism - the original theorised form of communism by Marx and Engels. [^4]: Terrorism Financing [^5]: Source [^6]: Targeted Killing Team